Advanced Aerial Threats Anomalous Aerial Vehicles - What The Military Knows About UFOs

Advanced Aerial Threats or anomalous aerial vehicles, Marco Rubio wants to know what the military knows about UFOs.

Rubio was head of the Senate Intelligence Committee when he wrote a provision into the Intelligence Authorization Act requiring the report as part of the $2.3 trillion coronavirus relief and government funding bill that President Donald Trump signed into law in December.

The Pentagon and Director of National Intelligence were due to deliver by June 25 a non-classified report with a “detailed analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena data” collected by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Based on the Report it appears that the report was delivered in reverse. Classified, including an unclassified annex for the general public.

It is doubtful that under Biden the FBI will produce the required report, or be required to produce the report in detail for the general public.

Here is Rubio's Provision:The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting onunidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive process within the Federal Government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, andthis issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.

Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena (also known as ``anomalous aerial vehicles''), including observed airborne objects that have not been identified.

The Committee further directs the report to include:

1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:
   1. geospatial intelligence;
   2. signals intelligence;
   3. human intelligence; and
   4. measurement and signals intelligence;
3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted United States airspace;
4. A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting for the Federal Government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;
5. Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4;
6. Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary may have achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put United States strategic or conventional forces at risk; and
8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and development, and additional funding and other resources.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Coordination of Security for Domestic Military Installations and Other Facilities

The Committee is concerned that, as a result of several recent incidents of attempted unauthorized access to Naval Air Station Key West and Fort Story, Virginia by Chinese nationals, several security vulnerabilities have been discovered. Foreign adversaries may be systematically probing military installations and facilities, and it is important that the Department of Defense take responsibility for ensuring security measures are adequate, unauthorized accesses are tracked, and uniform reporting requirements for attempted unauthorized accesses are established.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in coordination with the DNI and the Director of the FBI, to establish within the Office of the USD(I&S) a designee responsible for coordination of security for domestic military installations and other domestic military facilities. Specifically, the designee's responsibilities shall include tracking unauthorized incursions into domestic military installations and facilities and attempts at such incursions.

The Committee further directs that, within 180 days of enactment of this Act, such individual shall develop a strategy for security and counterintelligence collection that defines the capability requirements, responsibilities, and processes for security and counterintelligence for domestic military installations and other domestic military facilities. In addition, not less frequently than once each year, the Under Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate elements of the DoD and the IC, brief the intelligence and armed services committees on the:

1. Activities of the designee; and
2.  Current and anticipated trends and developments in connection with security for domestic military installations and other domestic military facilities.

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Modernization and

Integration Efforts of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-functional

Team of the Department of Defense

The Committee is concerned with the intelligence silos that have resulted from isolated procurement programs that store data in individual repositories, each with its own set of cataloging procedures and proprietary technologies. This, in turn, potentially limits advantageous communications among databases, causes vital intelligence to go undetected, and causes duplication of separately-located analysts' efforts in reviewing other, less vital, intelligence information.

Therefore, the Committee directs the head of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, as established in the Department of Defense by memorandum dated April 26, 2017, to submit to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report that includes:

1. Recommendations for the delineation of efforts between the Team and the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, especially with respect to data labeling, testing and evaluation;
2. Recommendations for resource sharing across the intelligence community for test and evaluation as Project Maven transitions its independent lines of effort;
3. The plan of the Team to integrate unsupervised artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g., algorithms that learn from data without being trained, allowing the artificial intelligence to self-improve) into Project Maven;
4. The plan of the Team to incorporate independent data repositories located across the intelligence community, irrespective of the element providing the data or the domain they are resident to, into Project Maven; and
5. The plan of the Team to ensure that development of Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination technology that will facilitate and enhance the capability of analysts to rapidly search across near real-time sensors, leverage historical data, and identify valuable intelligence is incorporated into the Defense Intelligence Agency Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System.